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The financial crisis has generated a high degree of legislative activity both in the area of
substantive and procedural financial regulation and in the area of taxation of the financial
sector. This article explores criteria for legislative choice (in particular for the European
Union) when a given target can be addressed both by regulatory means and by fiscal burdens.
Major examples include the (1) choice between capital requirements for financial institutions
and the introduction of bank levies, (2) substantive constraints for executive compensation
versus a “bonus tax”, and (3) the relationship between the existing European regulatory
regime of financial markets and the current project of a “financial transaction tax”. While
bank levies can play a meaningful role alongside capital requirements, both the “bonus tax”
and the “financial transaction tax” seem less attractive than alternative regulatory options.
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I. Introduction
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, legislators around the world
have produced an enormous regulatory output aiming at tighter control of
economic actors, in particular banks and other professional financial market
operators, with a view on increased protection of private investors. Notable
legislation includes the “Basel III Accord” on capital requirements for banks1,
the “Dodd Frank Wallstreet Reform and Consumer Protection Act”2 in the
United States and a bewildering array of regulations, directives, delegated
regulations and intergovernmental agreements at the level of the European
Union3. Recent arrivals from Brussels include the Capital Requirements Reg-
ulation4 and the CRD IV Directive5 issued in 2013 as well as a host of legis-
lation in 2014 setting up a European resolution regime for credit institutions6.
Overshadowing domestic and international legislation is the political consen-
sus at the level of the G20 and the work of its Financial Stability Board7 as well
as the authoritative publications of the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision8. In terms of legal technique, financial regulation under these enact-
ments largely affects supervisory law for financial markets as well as the
1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for
more resilient banks and banking systems, December 2010.
2 111th Congress Public Law 203.
3 Elke Gurlit/Isabel Schnabel, The New Actors of Macroprudential Supervision in Ger-
many and Europe – A Critical Evaluation, 27 Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirt-
schaft (2015) p.349–362.
4 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26th
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and
amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012, O.J. L 176/1 of 27th June 2013.
5 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26th June 2013
on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Direc-
tives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, O.J. L 176/338 of 27th June 2013.
6 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15th May 2014
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and invest-
ment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/ED,
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU, and Regulations
(EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, O.J. L 173/190 of 12th June 2014; Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 15th July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a
uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in
the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and
amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, O.J. L 225/1 of 30th July 2014.
7 See recently: Financial Stability Board – The Chairman, To G20 Leaders: Financial Re-
form – Achieving and Sustaining Resilience for All, 9th November 2015.
8 See recently: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Ninth progress report on adop-
tion of the Basel regulatory framework, October 2015.
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corporate governance of banks – a topic, which Klaus Hopt has profoundly
examined in two seminal papers published in 20109 and 201310 respectively.
This major evolution in the world of regulation has been accompanied by a
parallel development in the world of taxation. Taxation of the financial sector
was first tabled in a comprehensive fashion at the level of the G20 at their
Pittsburgh Summit in 2009 when political leaders asked the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to
“prepare a report for our next meeting with regard to the range of options
countries have adopted or are considering as to how the financial sector could
make a fair and substantial contribution toward paying for any burden asso-
ciated with government interventions to repair the banking system”11
While this wording clearly and simply aimed at the extraction of public rev-
enue from the financial sector to make up for the damage done so far, the G20
ministers and central bank governors who met in April 2010 took a more
sophisticated stance, adding regulatory goals to the brief. They called upon
the IMF to undertake
“further work on options to ensure domestic financial institutions bear the
burden of any extraordinary government interventions where they occur, ad-
dress their excessive risk taking and help promote a level playing field, taking
into consideration individual country’s circumstances.”12
Under this heading, the IMF put forward its widely influential 2010 report on
“A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector”13 which laid out
three major options for fiscal interventions in the financial sector:
– A “financial stability contribution” largely along the lines of “bank levies”
previously introduced in several countries14. The most prominent example
9 Klaus-Jürgen Hopt, Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis, in: Eddy
Wymeersch/Klaus Jürgen Hopt/Guido Ferrarini (Ed.), Financial Regulation and Super-
vision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP) 2012, p.337–367.
10 Klaus Jürgen Hopt, Corporate Governance of Banks and other Financial Institutions
after the Financial Crisis, 13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2013) p.219–253.
11 G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24-25, 2009, Pittsburgh, A
Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth, para 16.
12 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 23rd April 2010, Commu-
niqué, para 4.
13 International Monetary Fund, A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial
Sector: Final Report for the G-20, June 2010; Michael Keen, The Taxation and Regu-
lation of Banks, IMF Working Paper (WP/11/206), 2011.
14 International Monetary Fund supra note 13, para 13 et seq.; for the UK bank levy see:
Michael Devereux, Will the bank levy meet its objectives?, British Tax Review (2010)
p.33–39; Liesl Fichardt, Taxing the Financial Sector: Bank Levies in the United King-
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for such a bank levy has recently been established for the Eurozone under
the European single resolution regime as banks from all participating coun-
tries have to pay fees transferred to and centrally administered by a single
resolution fund15.
– A “financial activities tax” (FAT) on excessive profits derived from exces-
sive risk-taking16. While the IMF and leading academics17 strongly pro-
posed action in this direction, they did not meet with wide support polit-
ically. Only in a few countries, small remnants of the FATcan be found in –
mostly temporary – attempts to establish a special charge on bankers’
bonuses18 and in the very recent introduction of a “corporation tax sur-
charge” on bank profits by the UK Government19.
– The most prominent of these three archetypes of financial sector taxation is
the “financial transaction tax” (FTT) which the IMF itself in its study
clearly dismissed as overly blunt and misguided20. Nevertheless, a directive
on the FTTwas proposed by the European Commission in 2011 for being
the standard for the whole European Union21; following rejection by the
dom, in: Otto Marres/Dennis Weber (Ed.), Taxing the Financial Sector: Financial Taxes,
Bank Levies and More (IBFD 2012) p.71–86.
15 Art. 99 et seq. Directive 2014/59/EU supra note 5; Art. 67 Regulation (EU) No. 806/
2014 supra note 4; Lucia Orszaghova/Martina Miskova, Financial Contributions and
Bank Fees in the Banking Union, 23 Rocnik (2015) p.13–18; as to the political back-
ground of the creation of the Single Resolution Mechanism see: David Howarth/Lucia
Quaglia, The Steep Road to European Banking Union: Constructing the Single Reso-
lution Mechanism, 52 Journal of Common Market Studies (2014) p.125–140.
16 International Monetary Fund supra note 13 para 32 et seq.
17 Michael P. Devereux, New Bank Taxes: Why and What Will Be the Effects?, in: Ruud de
Mooij/Gaetan Nicodème (Ed.), Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector (MIT
2014) p.25 et seq. (at 48); Daniel N. Shaviro, The Financial Transaction Tax vs the
Financial Activities Tax, in: Otto Marres/Dennis Weber (Ed.), Taxing the Financial
Sector: Financial Taxes, Bank Levies and More (IBFD 2012), p.165–202 (at 176 et
seq.); Thomas Hemmelgarn/Gaetan Nicodème, Can Tax Policy Help to Prevent the
Financial Crisis?, in: Julian S. Alworth/Giampaolo Arachi (Ed.), Taxation and the Fi-
nancial Crisis (OUP 2012) p.116–147 (at p.122 et seq.).
18 For a comparative view see: IMF supra note 13, para 9 and Appendix 2, C/D/E; Holger
Fleischer, Zur Regulierung der Vorstandsvergütung durch das Steuerrecht, Der Betrieb
(2010) p.601–607; Paolo Ludovici/Mario Tenore, Financial Activities Tax (FAT) in Italy,
in: Otto Marres/Dennis Weber (Ed.), Taxing the Financial Sector: Financial Taxes, Bank
Levies and More (IBFD 2012), p.87–96.
19 Her Majesty’s Treasury, Summer Budget 2015, para 1.201–1.203; as to the impact of the
new tax on the financial markets see: Competition and Markets Authority, Retail bank-
ing market investigation: Corporation tax surcharge and bank levy, 26th February 2016.
20 International Monetary Fund supra note 13 para 28 et seq.
21 Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and
amending Directive 2008/7/EC of 28th August 2011 COM(2011)594 final; Oskar Hen-
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United Kingdom and some other Member States, the FTT is still on the
political agenda and currently under examination for being introduced on
the basis of the “enhanced cooperation” procedure among a limited group
of Member States22.
These three major types of financial sector taxation do not only aim at raising
revenue. They are meant to fulfill regulatory functions, to correct market
failure and to steer individual behavior towards efficient outcomes23. Both
lawyers and economists attempt to justify such types of taxes as ”Pigouvian”
in the tradition of Arthur Pigou‘s concept of taxation as a means to “internal-
ize” social cost at the level of the economic actor causing the social harm24. But
this legislative intention immediately brings up the question of how to recon-
cile regulatory action which consists of new supervisory mechanisms and
additional corporate governance rules on the one hand with burdensome cor-
rective taxation on the other hand. Mike Devereux from Oxford University
has put it this way25: Either tax law and regulatory law set incentives for
identical behavior – then one of the instruments seems to be superfluous.
Or tax law and regulatory law set incentives in different directions – then
we might have a case of contradicting legislation which requires adjustments
along one of the two dimensions. Multiple instruments, as has been noticed,
kow, The FTT Proposal – An Overview of Legal Issues Arising, in: Otto Marres/Dennis
Weber (Ed.), Taxing the Financial Sector: Financial Taxes, Bank Levies and More (IBFD
2012), p.1–24.
22 Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of
financial transaction tax of 14th February 2013 COM(2013)71 final; for a critical assess-
ment see: Giorgia Maffini/John Vella, Evidence-based policy making? The Commis-
sions’s Proposal for an FTT, OUCBT Working paper series, WT15/15, 2015; financial
transaction taxes in place or considered in the Member States of the European Union are
discussed by: Gaetan Nicodème/Thomas Hemmelgarn/Bogdan-Alexandru Tasnadi/
Pol Vermote, Financial Transaction Taxes in the European Union, 69 National Tax
Journal (2016) p.217–240; the legal framework of “enhanced cooperation” is analyzed
by Federico Fabbrini, Taxing and Spending in the Euro Zone: Legal and Political Chal-
lenges to the Adoption of the Financial Transaction Tax, 39 European Law Review
(2014) p.155–175; Joachim Englisch/John Vella/Anzhela Yevgenyeva, The Financial
Transaction Tax Proposal Under the Enhanced Cooperation Procedure: Legal and Pro-
cedural Considerations, British Tax Review (2010) p.223–259.
23 IMF supra note 13, para 15 and Appendix 3.
24 Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th Ed., 1932 (reprint 1952) p.223 et seq.;
for a recent plea by lawyers in favor of corrective taxation see: Jonathan S. Masur/Eric
A. Posner, Towards a Pigouvian State, 164 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
(2015) p.93–147; see also: Douglas A. Shackelford/Daniel N. Shaviro/Joel Slemrod,
Taxation and the Financial Sector, 63 National Tax Journal (2010) p.781–806; Carlo
Garbarino/Giulio Allevato, The Global Architecture of Financial Regulatory Taxes,
36 Michigan Journal of International Law (2015) p.603–648.
25 Devereux supra note 17, p.43 et seq.; Devereux supra note 14, p.37 et seq.
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sometimes simply reflect “the temptation of politicians to ‘fix everything’”26 –
both by taxing and by regulating a specific target27.
Given the enormous amount of literature on both the regulation and the
taxation of the financial sector, it is striking that the interaction between these
two areas of legislation has rarely been discussed28. This is particularly true for
the political debate where the different administrative and legislative units
entrusted with regulation and taxation respectively do not seem to talk to each
other very often. Among academics, mostly economists have addressed the
issue29 while legal scholars have been largely mute30. Taking a closer look, this
case is a prominent example of the well-known debate on regulatory choice –
giving advice to the legislator which instrument from the “toolbox” is best for
which purpose. Klaus Hopt has expressed his credo in this debate clear enough:
Form follows function! is the guiding theme which he has translated from
aesthetics into law31. Following his advice, this article embarks on the func-
tional approach in order to decide on the merits of regulation and taxation of
26 Cameron Hepburn, Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A Review of Instrument
Choice, 22 Oxford Review of Economic Policy (2006) p.226–247 (231).
27 For an example of “regulatory collision” within the regulatory framework of the finan-
cial sector see: Colleen M. Baker, Regulatory reforms and unintended collisions: the case
of the Volcker Rule and the over-the-counter derivative markets, 10 Capital Markets
Law Journal (2015) p.433–446.
28 A related issue concerns the joint use of corrective taxation and liability rules (Steven
Shavell, Corrective Taxation versus Liability, 101 American Economic Review: Papers
& Proceedings (2011) p.273–276; Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation versus Liability as
a Solution to the Problem of Harmful Externalities, 54 Journal of Law and Economics
(2011) p.249–266 (at 263 et seq.); Michelle J. White/Donald Wittman, A Comparison of
Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules under Imperfect Information, 12 Journal of Legal
Studies (1983) p.413–425).
29 IMF supra note 13, Appendix 3; Keen supra note 13; Enrico Perotti/Javier Suarez, A
Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation, 7 International Journal of Central Banking
(2011) p.3–41; Julian S. Alworth/Giampaolo Arachi (Ed.), Taxation and the Financial
Crisis (OUP) 2012; Ruud de Mooij/Gaetan Nicodème (Ed.), Taxation and Regulation of
the Financial Sector (MIT Press), 2014; Saijid M. Chaudhry/Andrew W. Mullineux/
Natasha Agarwal (Ed.), Balancing the Regulation and Taxation of Banking (Elgar:
Northampton), 2015.
30 But see: Alexander Hellgardt, Comparing Apples and Oranges? Public, Private, Tax,
and Criminal Law Instruments in Financial Markets Regulation, and John Vella, Reg-
ulatory Choice: Observations on the Recent Experience with Corrective Taxes in the
Financial Sector, both articles in: Wolf-Georg Ringe/Peter Michael Huber (Ed.), Legal
Challenges in the Global Financial Crisis: Bail-outs, the Euro and Regulation (Blooms-
bury) 2015, p.157–176 and p.177–186; Tim Edgar, Corrective Taxation, Leverage, and
Compensation in a Bloated Financial Sector, 33 Virginia Tax Review (2014) p.393–428;
for an interdisciplinary perspective see: Shackelford/Shaviro/Slemrod supra note 24,
p. 791 et seq.
31 Klaus Jürgen Hopt, Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen europäischen und internationalen
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the financial sector. This approach is also in line with the recently issued
“Action Plan” of the European Commission on the “Capital Markets Union”
where the Commission announces a
“comprehensive review, in parallel with this Action Plan, of the cumulative
impact and coherence of the financial legislation adopted over the past years
and the numerous interactions between them, (as) there is a risk that their
collective impact may have some unintended consequences, which may not
be picked up within individual sectoral reviews”32.
In order to set this in motion we shall focus on three different issues which are
each central to the debate:
– the choice between regulatory capital requirements and a bank levy when it
comes to creditor protection and the fight against excessive risk taken by
banks;
– the choice between supervisory restrictions for executive pay versus a
bonus tax – both meant to fight inefficient incentives for bank managers;
– the choice between substantive directives and regulations on market be-
havior, financial services and the like versus the financial transaction tax
with regard to ensuring the credibility and stability of capital markets.
II. Fundamentals
1. Permission and Prohibition versus Pricing
When it comes to the assessment of different legislative tools, legal scholars
show a tendency to make distinctions along the lines of legality versus illegal-
ity33. This feeds into a view which considers regulation to work with a binary
code of “permission versus prohibition” while taxation simply sets public
Finanzmarktarchitektur, 12 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (2009) p.1401–1408
(at 1402).
32 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union (COM(2015)468
final) para 3.4; for a critical assessment see: Wolf-Georg Ringe, Capital Markets Union
for Europe: a commitment to the Single Market of 28, 9 Law and Financial Markets
Review (2015) p.5–7.
33 Christoph Trzaskalik, Inwieweit ist die Verfolgung ökonomischer, ökologischer und
anderer öffentlicher Zwecke durch Instrumente des Abgabenrechts zu empfehlen?,
Gutachten E für den 63. Deutschen Juristentag (C.H.Beck) 2000, at p.E 16.
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prices for a given behavior without any positive or negative assessment of the
activity as such.
Taking a closer look and leaving aside any moral or reputational concerns or
tools (like “corporate shaming”34), this distinction is less obvious. On the one
hand it is clear that taxation is normally not intended to fully wipe out certain
activities and that it only assigns a (moderate) extra cost to a given behavior.
But it is easy to devise a confiscatory tax, which aims so high that it renders the
taxed activity more or less meaningless, thus functioning like an outright
prohibition. On the other hand it is evident that one can model each regulatory
prohibition as a highly progressive tax which applies a zero rate until you cross
a certain limit (e.g. a minimum capital requirement or an upper ceiling for
executive pay), the “tax” being the amount of fines, penalties, profit disgorge-
ments and damage claims an offender has to face in the case he transgresses the
borderline between the permitted and the prohibited behavior. Apart from
quite severe cases, which lead to professional disqualification or even impris-
onment, all adverse consequences of being caught breaking the law can be
expressed in monetary terms – like a tax. Both regulation and taxation there-
fore simply lead to an increase in the cost attached to a certain economic event
albeit with a quite different design of the cost function.
2. Raising Revenue versus Regulating Risk and Rewards
Another commonly held belief refers to the effect of legislative tools on the
borderline between the private sector and the public sector. While the use of
tax instruments is associated with the transfer of private funds to the public
coffers, instruments in the area of private law – e.g. a corporate governance
framework – rather seem to redistribute wealth and income between private
parties. The latter also seems to hold true for supervisory activities which do
not end up in major financial reallocations to the detriment of private eco-
nomic actors. Nevertheless, a closer view reveals the need for some further
distinctions35:
– The first glance is devoted to taxation: A bank levy might go the general
budget of a state like any mainstream tax: but it might as well be used to set
up a resolution fund dedicated for bank bailouts36. This keeps the money in
the financial market system but not in the hands of individual private
34 David A. Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view (2001) p.1811–1868.
35 Brian D. Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge? Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 Texas
Law Review (2014) p.837–894 (849 et seq. and 869 et seq.).
36 IMF supra note 13 para 22 et seq.
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actors. This middle ground between private market and public budget
brings about specific benefits and drawbacks which we will go into at a
later stage.
– There are similar sophistications necessary when regulatory action has to
be designed37: A legislator might choose to grant permits and licenses for
free – then all the money stays within the ambit of the private markets – or
the regulator licenses these rights against consideration as we have seen for
broadband telecommunication licenses and for environmental permits in
the cap-and-trade market. A financial regulator might therefore think of
simply selling a given number of bank licenses to the highest bidders – thus
creating an up-front financial cushion in the public domain, weeding out
inefficiently prepared market participants and making bankers pay for
their rent-seeking activities.
Irrespective of these budgetary consequences, the primary aspect both for
taxation and regulation remains the corrective goal, i.e. the legislative intention
to interfere with the economic activities of private economic actors. And
insofar both regulation and taxation carry the same agenda. They are meant
to increase market efficiency by countering inefficient incentives, addressing
market failures and guiding private decision-making towards equilibrium
where social welfare is improved as far as possible. But any misguided provi-
sions on corporate governance, bank supervision or financial market taxation
will entail excess burdens, so-called “deadweight losses” which signal ineffi-
cient behavior and damage social welfare without showing up in the public
budget. The choice of legislative tools: either legislative regulation or correc-
tive taxation is primarily concerned with these “deadweight losses” and to a
less extent with the income and redistribution outcomes of the payments
effected to the public budget.
3. Quantities versus Prices: The Information Problem
Against this background, the economic analysis of financial market taxation has
been largely built on an earlier debate which took off in the 1970s, i.e. the
economic analysis of environmental legislation38. Just like eco-taxes are meant
to increase the cost of polluting air and water, thus internalizing the social costs
affecting the environment, financial sector taxation is meant to fight excessive
risk taking which imposes negative externalities on society at large, in particular
37 Hepburn supra note 26, p.236.
38 For a recent account of the merits of corrective taxation for environmental policy see:
N. Gregory Mankiw, Smart Taxes: An Open Invitation to Join the Pigou Club, 35
Eastern Economic Journal (2009) p.14–23.
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when banks which are “too big to fail” have to be bailed out with public money.
Inacademicworkonenvironmental taxation, thechoicebetweenregulationand
taxation has been broken down to a choice between “quantities” and “prices”,
meaningthatbyregulationyouallocatecertain“quantities” tocertaineconomic
actors (e. g. you distribute a limited number of pollution permits) while by
taxation you increase the price for pollution irrespective of the amount of pol-
lution that actually happens39. It may look somewhat far-fetched that recent
economic research on financial markets models regulation as the allocation of
“quantities” to financial actors as well – this would imply that the setting of
capitalrequirementsortheimplementationofcorporategovernanceconstraints
can be understood as granting a bank the permission to emit a certain amount of
dangerous risk to the market. A main difference lies in the fact that unlike for
carbon dioxide emissions there is no fixed stock of banking permits that can be
repartitioned across the whole (global) economy. Nevertheless there is one ma-
jor lesson that can be learned from this example and this debate:
In a seminal article from 197440, Martin Weitzman from the MIT highlighted,
that the choice between quantities and prices does not play a role when the
legislator is fully informed about the state of the world and all possible out-
comes41. In such a mode of full knowledge it will be easy for the legislator to
enact laws either in the field of regulation or in the area of taxation which will
have an identical targeted effect on the behavior or private actors and which
will do away with negative externalities or other sources of inefficiency right
away. The choice between regulation and taxation comes up when – as always
in real life – the legislator is not fully informed about the size of the potential
harm, the amount of potential benefits of legislation and the efficiency gains
and losses, which have to be reckoned with42.
In this state of partial information a well-advised legislator will try to find out
whether regulation or taxation is better equipped to address the “known un-
knowns” as well as the “unknown unknowns” existing in the real world. For
the choice between prices and quantities Weitzman himself reached the con-
clusion that the answer depends on whether the harm for social welfare seems
to follow a gradually rising curve or whether there is a relatively clear focal
point where the curve suffers a “kink”, i.e. where the harm changes direction
dramatically for the better or for the worse43. If the harms follow a gradually
rising curve it might be advisable to use a corrective tax which incrementally
raises the price for externalities in order to reach a stable state of efficiency.
39 For a review of the literature see: Cameron Hepburn supra note 26 at p.229 et seq.
40 Martin Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, Review of Economic Studies (1970) p.477–491.
41 IMF supra note 13, p.12 Box 2 and Appendix 3, p.50 et seq.
42 Weitzman supra note 40, p.481.
43 Weitzman supra note 40, p.485.
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Environmental taxation for carbon dioxide emissions largely follows this ap-
proach. But if the curve shows a dramatic “kink” at a certain focal point it
seems better to address that focal point and to limit behavior by strict regu-
lation. A clear example is water pollution. If a gradual increase in contaminants
can result in a sudden death of the whole lake, you will not simply levy a linear
tax on pollution – you will clearly prefer a hard-and-fast regulation, which
allocates severe (progressive) sanctions and even criminal punishment to any
transgression of the ecological limit.
Kaplow/Shavell have rejected this distinction which refers to the shape of the
social benefit/harm curve44. They have pointed out that Weitzman’s result is
based on the assumption that corrective taxation generally applies a linear tax
rate (which follows the gradual increase of social cost effected by the harmful
activity in question). Contrary to this, a non-linear tax would easily emulate
the effects of quantity regulation in the case of a “kinked” social cost curve.
But this is only true if the regulator – in the light of imminent harm – can afford
to let private actors decide – in the light of their private benefits – whether or
not they are willing to pay the price for harmful behavior. Otherwise the
regulator will have to end up with an extraordinarily high non-linear tax rate
that amounts to an outright prohibition (if the level of activity crosses a certain
limit). As the regulator rarely knows the shape of the private benefit curve it
seems easier to go for “command and control” in cases when violations have to
be prohibited “at all cost”.
Last but not least the “information problem” comes up again when there is a
high degree of heterogeneity across private actors with regard to the social cost
inflicted by a given behavior. In a recent article, Victor Fleischer puts forward
the example of a “gun tax” meant to curb proliferation of weapons in the
United States45. As social harm differs hugely depending on whether guns
are owned by law-abiding citizens or by criminals, it is next to impossible
to design a tax right on target. Shall people file tax returns ticking boxes
depending on their willingness to comply with the law? In particular in reg-
ulatory fields where the size of social harm critically depends on the level of
individual “care” taken by private actors to avoid this harm, the ensuing
variation of private behavior cannot practically be monitored by the tax au-
thorities46. For such a situation, “command-and-control” regulation or liabil-
44 Louis Kaplow/Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity
Regulation, 4 American Law and Economics Review (2002) p.1 et seq.; Devereux supra
note 17, p.42 et seq.
45 Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 Vanderbilt Law Review
(2015) p.1673–1713 (1677 et seq.).
46 Shavell supra note 28 (JLE) p.250 et seq.; Hellgardt supra note 30, at p.163 concerning
sanctions for unsuitable investment advice.
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ity rules should be regarded as superior to corrective taxation. This test has to
be applied as well with regard to financial sector taxation as “there is (in this
sector) no single activity whose aggregate sum equals expected harm”47.
4. Interim Result
The – rather general – interim result can be described as follows: When the
legislature has to decide whether to apply regulatory of fiscal tools to remedy
social welfare losses, it has to take into account three features:
– the delineation between the private sector and the public sector: to what
extent does it make sense to transfer funds to the public budget?
– the curvature of the social cost function: do we perceive a clear tilting point
which makes it advisable to set substantive limitations at a certain point?
– the heterogeneity of the social cost function depending on individual behav-
ior: does it make sense to apply a common (linear or non-linear) tax rate
equally to a given set of private actors or activities?
5. General Tax Measures
Before we discuss legislative options of taxation versus regulation of the fi-
nancial markets in more detail one should exclude one major issue from this
exercise. There is a broad debate in the literature as to the extent to which
general features of the taxation of income and consumption have contributed
to the financial crisis in the first place. A lot of blame is put on two potentially
harmful elements of the current tax system:
– In the first place, the deductibility of interest payments to creditors as
opposed to the non-deductibility of dividends paid to shareholders is re-
garded as a “debt bias” which reinforces the general trend for banks to
drive debt leverage beyond the efficient mix of funds recommended for the
banking business48. This view has also been taken by the European Com-
47 Shackelford/Shaviro/Slemrod supra note 24, p.792
48 Michael Keen/Ruud de Mooij, Debt, Taxes, and Banks, IMF Working Paper (WP/12/
48); Michael Keen/Alexander Klemm/Victoria Perry, Culprit, Accomplice, or Bystand-
er? Tax Policy and the Shaping of the Crisis, in: Julian S. Alworth/Giampaolo Arachi
(Ed.), Taxation and the Financial Crisis (OUP) 2012, p.28 et seq. (at 30 et seq.); Daniel
N. Shaviro, Income Tax Implications of the Financial Crisis, in: Julian S. Alworth/
Giampaolo Arachi (Ed.), Taxation and the Financial Crisis (OUP) 2012, p.174 et seq.
(at 176 et seq.); Thomas Hemmelgarn/Daniel Teichmann, Tax reforms and capital struc-
ture of banks, European Commission Taxation Papers, Working Paper 37-2013, 2013;
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mission, most recently in its “Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets
Union”49.
– In the second place, the exemption of financial services from the Value
Added Tax is perceived as a wide-reaching tax subsidy for banks, increasing
returns to risk-taking and contributing to an unsound extension of banking
activities at large50.
It should be clear that a discussion of these two points would require a major
analysis of income taxation and consumption taxation as a whole.
III. Capital Requirements and Bank Levies
Capital requirements for banks have been at the heart of the regulatory system
right from the start of the financial crisis (and even before that). When we look
at the evolution of capital requirements we have to start with the Basel I
Accord of 1988. Following the demise of the German Herstatt Bank in
1973, the G10 countries decided to set up the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision which released the Basel I Standard in 1988, prescribing a rough-
and-ready minimum capital ratio of 8 % of risk-weighted assets after applying
hugely simplified risk assessments to certain categories of assets like cash,
treasuries, mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, shares etc. In 2004,
the Basel II accord entered into force, which introduced major refinements to
this approach. On the right side of the balance sheet it provided for different
capital requirements with reference to “Tier 1” and “Tier 2” capital and on the
left side of the balance sheet it established a more individualized system of
risk-weighting, e.g. by reliance on internal and external credit ratings. As the
Basel II system was widely blamed both for not having prevented the financial
Sven Langedijk/Gaetan Nicodème/Andrea Pagano/Alessandro Rossi, Debt Bias in Cor-
porate Taxation and the Costs of Banking Crises in the EU, European Commission
Taxation Papers, Working Paper 50-2014, 2014; skeptical Edgar supra note 30, p.394 et
seq., 414; for a full account of the debt/equity distinction from the legal perspective see:
Wolfgang Schön et al., Debt and Equity in Domestic and International Tax Law – A
Comparative Policy Analysis. In: British Tax Review (2014) p.146–217.
49 Supra note 32, para 2, page 14.
50 IMF supra note 13, Appendix 6 p.64 et seq.; Ruud de Mooij/Gaetan Nicodème, Taxation
and Regulation of the Financial Sector, in: Ruud de Mooij/Gaetan Nicodème (Ed.),
Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector (MIT) 2014, p.1–22 (at p.3); for a general
analysis see: Robin Boadway/Michael Keen, Theoretical Perspectives on the Taxation of
Capital Income and Financial Services, in: Patrick Honohan (Ed.), Taxation of Financial
Intermediation: Theory and Practice for Emerging Economies (World Bank/OUP),
2003, p.31–80 (at p.59 et seq.); Peter Merrill, VAT Treatment of the Financial Sector,
The VAT Reader, 2011, p.163–185.
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crisis in the first place and in the second place for having accelerated the
financial crisis by enforcing “fire sales” by banks, the Basel Committee looked
for better solutions and came up with the Basel III accord of 200951. This
accord, implemented within the European Union under the Capital Require-
ments Regulation52 and the CRD IV Directive53 in 2013, does not only lift the
risk-weighted capital ratios for common equity, Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital,
substantially, it also introduces a non-risk dependent leverage minimum ratio
of 3 % for all credit institutions. On top of these interlinked safety cushions,
banks which are of systemic relevance at a global level (so-called G-SIBs) have
to provide even higher capital ratios for macro-prudential purposes54 follow-
ing the recent findings of the Financial Stability Board55 and the conclusions of
the G20 summit56 in Antalya in November 2015. The so-called “loss absorbing
capacity” of these very large financial institutions is meant to rise to nearly 20
% of assets in future years.
These capital requirements under banking law can be regarded as the primary
instrument of creditor protection for financial institutions – and at the same
time they are meant to suppress excessive risk taking leading to bail-outs by
governments as shareholders are forced to have substantial “skin in the
game”57.
Nevertheless, both at the European level and at the German level, there is a
parallel route of creditor protection taken under tax law: the bank levy58. It
was introduced in 2010 by the federal legislator for all German credit institu-
tions (apart from a small sample of special-purpose public banks)59 and in 2014
the European legislator created a similar bank levy for the Euro area60. But
does this make sense? In its latest report on the implementation of the Basel III
accord, the Financial Stability Board explained that the mandated increase in
51 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision supra note 1 (2010) para 7 et seq.
52 Supra note 4.
53 Supra note 5.
54 For an overview see: Stijn Claessens, An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools,
IMF Working Paper (WP/14/214), 2014.
55 Financial Stability Board, Implementation and Effects of the G20 financial regulatory
reforms: Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders, 9th November 2015,
chapter 3.2 (“Implementation Status: Ending too-big-to-fail”).
56 G20 Leaders’ Communiqué, Antalya Summit, 15–16 November 2015, para 13.
57 IMF supra note 13, Appendix 3, p.53; Anat Admati/Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ new
Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do about it? (Princeton University
Press) 2013, p.81 et seq.
58 A similar proposal for the U.S. has been raised by Masur/Posner supra note 24 p.129 et
seq.
59 Wolfgang Schön/Alexander Hellgardt/Christine Osterloh-Konrad, Bankenabgabe und
Verfassungsrecht, 64 Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (2010) p.2145–2157.
60 Supra note 6.
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regulatory capital over the next years is expected to be financed largely from
retained earnings and not from additional outside funding61. Against this back-
ground, an additional tax on the balance sheet seems to undermine the efforts
of improving the capital ratio. Any Euro spent on the bank levy cannot be
spent on lowering the leverage of the bank at the same time. Are these appa-
rently conflicting policies part of a convincing overall framework?
This would clearly not be the case if the money raised via the bank levy simply
went into the general budget of a state. This happened with the temporary
bank levy raised by the United States in 2009 – 2010, which was dedicated to
making up in retrospect for the public outlays supporting the financial sector
during the financial crisis62. Such a backward-looking bank levy carries mainly
a fiscal purpose and to a certain extent also a distributive purpose, as the
“wrongdoers” are visibly forced to pay their “fair share” for the financial mess
cleaned up by the government. From a policy point of view, the judgment is
not very different for a permanent bank levy paid to the general budget like the
UK bank levy, which was introduced in 2009 on an annual basis63. While there
may be some political agreement to regard this bank levy as a quid pro quo for
future bail-outs, there is no legal requirement for the United Kingdom to act
accordingly or to reserve dedicated funds for this purpose. Rather, the money
disappears in the annual budget and time will show whether and to what
extent any future government is willing to spend public money on a future
bank crash. In his recent contribution to the Oxford Handbook of Financial
Regulation, John Armour explicitly emphasizes the sovereign role of the Brit-
ish Parliament in any future bailout64. Against this background it sounds
sensible that the UK government has recently announced that from 2016 on
the bank levy will be cut by half while a new special tax on banks’ profits will
be introduced65.
The real question is brought up when you try to assess the German and the
European system of a bank levy designated to provide financing for a special
resolution fund, which will give relief to the general budget in later bailouts.
Within such a framework the regulatory capital requirement and the bank levy
do not contradict each other necessarily – they rather complement each other.
61 Financial Stability Board supra note 55, para 4.1 (“Building a more resilient financial
system”).
62 IMF supra note 13, para 11; for a critical view on retributive taxation of the financial
sector see: Devereux supra note 17, p.35 et seq.; Shackelford/Shaviro/Slemrod supra
note 24, p.784 et seq.
63 Devereux supra note 14, p.33 et seq.
64 John Armour, Making Bank Resolution Credible, in: Niamh Moloney/Eilís Ferran/
Jennifer Payne, The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP 2016) p.453–
486 (at p.479).
65 Supra note 19.
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When a bank is hit by a crisis, the regulatory capital will provide a first-level
cushion to safeguard creditors up to a certain limit. Once the capital is wiped out
and the bank falls into bankruptcy, the creditors will get access to the resolution
fund set up within a given jurisdiction – or (following European legislation)
within the Eurozone at large. The shareholders and the management will have
lost their control rights by then and the resolution procedure under the Euro-
pean resolution regime will cut its own path. The policy question for the inter-
action of capital requirements and bank levies therefore has to be reformulated:
Is the overall level of protection administered by these tools adequate and is the
division of labor between the two instruments correctly handled?
The first question leads us to the never-ending debate on the “right” level of
creditor protection within the European (and global) banking sector. It is well
known that no consensus on the adequate level of creditor protection has
emerged from the debate – neither in the political nor in the academic arena.
On the one hand, Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig have shown convincingly
that low capital ratios cannot be defended by the mere partisan interest of
shareholders in maintaining high leverage and high returns to capital66. Banks
had and have to be forced to raise the capital ratio even if existing bank shares
lose value on the stock exchange. On the other hand, no one would prescribe
100 % equity financing for banks simply in order to exclude the remote
possibility of creditors getting bailed out by the state. What’s more: The range
of possible investors in the market for bank capital will show a wide variety of
risk profiles, some of them preferring profit-dependent equity shares, others
preferring fixed-income debentures. If the market for bank finance is meant to
work efficiently it has to cater to both constituencies and capital requirements
cannot go up indefinitely. If we allow the banking business to accept debt
capital, creditor risk cannot and should not be excluded for good, as the social
value of the banking sector lies in financing the real economy where innova-
tion risk, production risk, market risk, political risk and many other risks are
the lifeblood of the economy itself and will inevitably lead to individual com-
panies (including financial institutions) having to exit the market due to mis-
management or simply bad luck67. In the end, the most efficient regulatory
setting is not clear and it is with great mistrust that one finds under the heading
of the coming “Capital Markets Union” and the accompanying consultation
process the European Commission proposing a new era of more lenient capital
requirements just in order to fuel the economy68.
All we can say at the end of the day is that a higher capital ratio increases the
cushion for creditors, thus making bankruptcy and bailout gradually less
66 Admati/Hellwig supra note 57, p.100 et seq.
67 IMF supra note 13, para 14; Chaudry/Mullineux/Agarwal supra note 29, p.18 et seq.
68 European Commission supra note 32, para 3.1. and 5.
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likely and less harmful. When we look at the bailout risk as a proxy for the
social costs done to the economy at large, there is simply a slowly upward-
sloping curve showing that every increase in the capital ratio will reduce
gradually the risk of a future bail-out funded from the general budget.
What does this mean for the choice between capital requirements and a bank
tax? It means in the first place that we do not see a dramatic “kink” in the
curvature of the cost function which makes it necessary to establish clear-cut
prohibitions when a certain level of indebtedness (or “interconnectedness”)
has been reached69. Such a slowly upward-sloping curve can be addressed both
by a capital ratio and by a bank levy70. But for the design of such a tax the
information problem strikes again:
– In the first place, it is unclear what level the levy should have in order to set
a calibrated disincentive against excessive risk-taking. While some pro-
posals have tried to identify a measure for excessive risk-taking based on
co-variance of risk71, legislation in most countries simply tries to approx-
imate the level of risk by applying a (progressive) tax rate to the size of a
bank’s liabilities72.
– Secondly, we do not have any idea beforehand what level the levy should
have to provide appropriate funds for a possible resolution required several
years later73. It might naturally well be that the two numbers do not co-
incide: the ex ante policy of making risk-taking more costly might lead to
an optimal bank tax completely different from the bank tax you need for
full and irredundant compensation for bank creditors ex post74.
69 A different view is taken by Edgar (supra note 30, p.413) who denotes a point where
“the level of risk-taking goes from the imposition of only potential social costs to the
imposition of actual costs as an institution becomes insolvent”. This may be right from
an ex post perspective but from an ex ante viewpoint it is not clear whether and where
exists a “tilting point” so that the rise in risky activities cannot be captured by a linear or
slowly progressive bank tax (concurring Hellgardt supra note 30, at p.167).
70 A preference for a tax is expressed by Perotti/Suarez supra note 29 (at p.19 et seq.), if the
externality is driven by risk and credit quality, while liquidity requirements are pre-
ferred, if the externality is driven by “gambles” undertaken by individual players; if both
scenarios have to be addressed, a combination of regulatory and tax instruments looks
like the dominant solution (at p.37).
71 Tobias Adrian/Markus K. Brunnermeier, CoVaR, NBER Working Paper 17454, 2011.
72 IMF supra note 13, para 21 and p.17 Box 3; Shackelford/Shaviro/Slemrod supra note 24,
p.794 et seq. and p.798 et seq.; Garbarino/Allevato supra note 24, p.620 et seq.; for the
recently introduced EU-wide contribution see: Orszhagova/Miskova supra note 15,
p.15 et seq.
73 Edgar supra note 30, p.417 et seq.
74 Devereux supra note 17, p.39; Edgar supra note 30, p.419 et seq.
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It is exactly this lack of information, which renders a policy mix attractive. If
we do not know where the optimal funding ratio has to be set and if we do not
have any meaningful take at the amount of revenue to be generated by the
bank tax it seems sensible for the legislator to place your bets on more than one
horse and to introduce not only a set of regulatory requirements for loss
absorption capacity and liquidity which have to be met simultaneously as
under Basel III but also a banking tax which ensures an additional layer of
protection for creditors75. In this picture, the bank tax does not contradict the
regulatory goals of the capital requirements. It rather works as an add-on to
traditional capital requirements, reserving additional funding for creditor pro-
tection.
This leads to the search for an efficient division of labor between the capital
requirements and the bank levy given a certain level of own funding: The
question runs as follows: Shall the larger part of the shareholders’ contribu-
tions (or retained earnings) remain under the control of the management of the
individual bank (then one should increase the capital ratio) or shall it be ad-
ministered by the executive board of the resolution fund, thus kept apart from
the assets of individual banks (then one should increase the bank tax)? This has
to be assessed on the basis of three factors: market expectations as to the
impact of the resolution fund on future bail-outs, the respective investment
policy76 and the “pooling effect” of the resolution fund.
– As far as the impact of regulatory and fiscal measures on “beliefs” resulting
in risk-taking incentives are concerned, Shackelford/Shaviro/Slemrod have
raised the question whether contributions to a dedicated fund as opposed
to a banking tax (which is simply paid to the general budget of the State)
will shape the behavior of market participants. They put forward the argu-
ment that this clearly defined fund might “effectively constrain the size of
future bailouts”77 as opposed to a general expectation that the State will
open its unlimited purse. But this assumption might be unrealistic, given
the fact that “governments tend to get drawn into large-scale bailouts, the
anticipation of which can distort ex-ante risk-taking incentives.”78 It is not
clear why and to what extent the existence of the fund will put that pressure
off the back of the State for good.
75 IMF supra note 13, Appendix 3, p.51; Keen supra note 13, p.23 et seq.
76 Reint Gropp, Taxes, Banks, and Financial Stability, in: Ruud de Mooij/Gaetan Nicodème
(Ed.), Regulation and Taxation of the Financial Sector (MIT Press) 2014, p.55–65 (at p.63):
“The exact nature of the investment may determine the overall success of the measure”.
77 Shackelford/Shaviro/Slemrod supra note 24, p.799.
78 Brian Coulter/Colin Mayer/John Vickers, Taxation and Regulation of Banks to Manage
Systemic Risk, in: Ruud de Mooij/Gaetan Nicodème (Ed.), Regulation and Taxation of
the Financial Sector (MIT Press) 2014, p.67–88 (at p.68).
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– With regard to the investment policy a higher capital ratio seems to be
superior to a bank levy. Under the European Regulation establishing a
Single Resolution Fund, the administrators are obliged to invest the
amounts held in the fund “in obligations of the Member States or inter-
governmental organizations, or in highly liquid assets of high creditwor-
thiness (. . .). Investments shall be sufficiently sectorally, geographically and
proportionally diversified”79. Similar rules apply to national resolution
funds like in Germany for the “Restrukturierungsfonds”. A bank levy
therefore entails a temporary transfer of private money to the general
budgets of the countries participating in the fund. Contrary to this, private
assets acquired out of equity by the bank’s managers reflect a market-
guided investment decision made by the managers on behalf of the share-
holders, thus participating in the risky world of the real economy and
contributing to overall economic growth outside the public sector. As long
as we accept the underlying assumption that investment in the private
sector is superior to investment in the public sector80, a higher capital ratio
will trump a higher bank levy.
– The assessment might be a different one with regard to the “pooling effect”
of the resolution fund. At first sight, any jointly administrated resolution
fund seems to offer the benefits of an insurance contract, spreading risk
among the industry in order to bail-out individual companies in distress81.
Moreover, due to the “pooling effect” such a fund would require less over-
all reserves than “decentralized” capital requirements82. But as Brian
Coulter, Colin Mayer and Jon Vickers have argued in a recent article, the
economics of insurance only apply when we set up a device against asym-
metric hits towards otherwise unrelated institutions83. The problem with
systemic risk in the banking sector lies rather in the symmetric effect of
macro-economic shocks like the financial crisis of 2007/08 or the following
Sovereign Debt Crisis in the Eurozone, which both hit the whole market
with one wide-sweeping stroke. Here the information problem haunts us
79 Art. 75 par.3 supra note 6.
80 This, of course, is subject to the influence of political economy pressures from politi-
cians or the general public (James M. Buchanan/Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ Profits and
Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 American Economic Review
(1975) p.139–147 (at p.142 et seq.).
81 Edgar supra note 30, p.416; Garbarino/Allevato supra note 24, p.624.
82 Chaudry/Mullineux/Agarwal supra note 29, p.17 et seq.; Coulter/Mayer/Vickers supra
note 80, p.82.
83 Coulter/Mayer/Vickers supra note 80, p.68; Giuseppina Cannas et al. (Financial Activ-
ities Taxes, Bank Levies and Systemic Risk, European Commission Taxation Papers,
Working Paper 43-2014, 2014) have shown that the optimal design of bank levies de-
pends on the question whether the fund is meant to address individual failure of in-
stitutions or contagion risk within the market.
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again: It cannot be said in advance whether the resolution fund will rather
be needed for an individual collapse or for a wide-reaching recapitalization
of the market in general; therefore it makes sense to introduce some in-
surance element to the overall design.
– Last but not least, the “pooling effect” shows another feature, which can be
useful from a regulatory point of view. Once a bank is on the brink of
failure with capital largely wiped out and no easy exit route on the horizon,
management (and shareholders) might react in an “endgame” sort of fash-
ion, leaving the regulatory framework behind and betting the whole com-
pany “on behalf” of the creditors. Under private law, this clear breach both
of supervisory and contractual obligations will only bring about damage
claims against the involved managers and shareholders which are largely
worthless, and any sanctions under administrative law or criminal law will
not help the creditors ex post as well. In such a situation a pile-up of ex ante
payments to a resolution fund shall provide at least some compensation to
the creditors. This makes it advisable to combine capital requirements
under supervisory law with a limited bank levy funding a resolution regime
– this is the world we live in today.
IV. Executive Pay and Bonus Taxation
The second topic where regulation and taxation interact in the area of financial
markets is executive pay. There are two major trajectories to follow: the pro-
cedural and substantive limitations set by the provisions on corporate gover-
nance for banks84 and the recurring proposal of a “bonus tax” on bankers’
compensation85. Both aim at reducing the incentive to assume excessive risk on
behalf of the company which works to the detriment of creditors’ claims
against the company.
The rules on corporate governance for banking institutions are fundamentally
shaped by a double-layer of conflicts between principals and agents. In the
first place, the standard conflict between shareholders and management comes
to the fore. Shareholders do not command the resources to fully observe and
84 Lucian A. Bebchuk/Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 Georgetown Law
Journal (2010) p.247–287; Guido Ferrarini/Niamh Moloney/Maria-Cristina Ungurea-
nu, Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe, 10
Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2010) p.73–118; Guido Ferrarini/Maria Cristina
Ungureanu, Bankers’ Pay after the 2008 Crisis: Regulatory Reform in the US and the
EU, Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft (2011) p.418–430; Peter Yeoh, Reg-
ulating Executive Remuneration in Anglo-American Economies, 36 Business Law Re-
view (2015) p.169–175.
85 Supra note 18–19.
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evaluate the efforts of the directors and officers of their corporation, therefore
one needs either statutory or contractual constraints to monitor the behavior
of the agent and to ensure that business activities aim both at enhancing share-
holder value and at compliance with the legal framework the company oper-
ates in. In this context, the principal agent conflict asks for a management
compensation scheme, which aligns interest of the corporate officers and di-
rectors with the interest of the shareholders. This is all well researched from a
contract design perspective86 and has gained traction among legislators around
the world.
This principal agent conflict addressed under general corporate law is super-
seded by a second principal agent conflict when financial institutions are in-
volved87. As far as banks are concerned, the bank as such – jointly comprising
shareholders and managers – acts as a trustee for creditors financing the activ-
ities of the bank to a large extent. Insofar as managers and shareholders jointly
take excessive risk, they take that risk on behalf of the creditors. In a fully
efficient market, creditors would take care of this possible outcome and ask for
corresponding collateral or demand higher interest rates. But given the myopic
nature of bank creditors and the general perspective of a government bailout,
creditors tend to be content with lower interest rates and do not press for
additional governance strings to be attached. This in turn leads to excess
profits on the side of the bank which both shareholders and managers will
share between them: shareholders get higher dividends, bankers get higher
bonuses88. Against this background legislative developments around the globe
– within the ambit of the G20 and their Financial Stability Board89, the Euro-
pean Union and the Federal Republic of Germany – have created in recent
years what Klaus Hopt aptly has called a framework of “debtholder gover-
nance”90, meaning a set of rules for boards and managers which aims specif-
ically at securing the rights of debtholders in addition to the mainstream set of
rules benefitting shareholders under general corporate law.
86 Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 2nd Ed. (OUP) 2009, chap-
ters 2 and 3; for recent quasi-experimental evidence on the impact of EU regulation see:
Johannes Sauset/Phillip Waller/Michael Wolff, CEO Contract Design Regulation and
Risk-Taking, 24 European Accounting Review (2015) p.685–725.
87 Bebchuk/Spamann supra note 84, p.255 et seq.; Hopt supra note 10, p.240 et seq.
88 Vieri Ceriani/Stefano Manestra/Giacomo Ricotti/Alessandra Sanelli, The Role of Taxes
in Compensation Schemes and Structured Finance, in: Julian S. Alworth/Giampaolo
Arachi (Ed.), Taxation and the Financial Crisis (OUP) 2012, p.88–115 (at p.89 et seq.);
for a skeptical view of the role of managers’ compensation in the run-up to the financial
crisis see: Ferrarini/Ungureanu supra note 84, p.418 et seq.
89 Financial Stability Board supra note 55, chapter 3.1. (Implementation Status: Building
resilient financial institutions); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Guidelines:
Corporate Governance for Banks, 2015, Principle 11 (Compensation).
90 Hopt supra note 10, p.243.
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Again, the CRD IV Directive91 highlights the prominent features of the new
rules: firstly, profit-dependent salaries shall relate to long-term profitability
and shall not be distorted by short-termism. The European initiatives have
pushed national legislators to provide for multi-year deferral of substantial
parts of executive compensation and even for a clawback of bonus payments in
case of adverse developments. Secondly, profit-dependent compensation must
not exceed a given portion of the fixed compensation, reducing the incentives
on the side of the managers to take huge risk on behalf of the company in order
to benefit strongly from a personal bet on the positive outcome.
It is clear that this set of rules will not be able to fully eradicate perverse
incentives on the side of managers. The big point to start with is the overall
size of the managers’ compensation. As long as there is no fixed ceiling for the
compensation package (like in Germany for banks living on public money),
any decrease in the manager’s profit participation might be balanced out by a
rise in fixed salaries92. But fixed salaries have their own drawbacks as has been
shown for ages in the general principal agent literature – they are granted
without paying any respect to the actual performance of the manager in ques-
tion and they might inflict damage on shareholders. Last but not least the
information problem mentioned in the introductory part comes up: As long
as we cannot identify the “first-best” salary package to be offered to a given
director or officer, we have to choose between either rather loose and vague
language aiming at the “adequacy” and “reasonableness” of the compensation
package or we put together a set of rather formal rules on procedure (e. g. on
board competence or shareholders’ “say on pay”) and on the ratio between
fixed income and variable income which will never fully meet the expectations.
Does the law of taxation offer any help? On the high point of the financial
crisis, several countries including the United Kingdom93 and France94 have
temporarily introduced special charges on bonus payments for bank manag-
91 Supra note 5; Jens-Hinrich Binder, The Banking Union and the Governance of Credit
Institutions: A Legal Perspective, 16 European Business Law Review (2015) p.467–490
(at p.483 et seq.); Jad Nader/Meliha Dacic, Regulation of Remuneration Policies in the
Financial Sector, 57 Bulletin Droit et Banque (2015) issue 12, p.35–49; as to previous EU
reforms in this area see Ferrarini/Ungureanu supra note 84, p.424 et seq.; recent em-
pirical work on the effects of these provisions shows mixed results: Jörg-Markus Hitz/
Stephanie Müller-Bloch, Market Reactions to the Regulation of Executive Compensa-
tion, 24 European Accounting Review (2015) p.659–684;
92 This is exactly what happened in recent years, see: European Banking Authority, EBA
Report: Benchmarking of Remuneration Practices at the European Union Level and
Date on High Earners (Data as of End 2014), EBA-OP-2016-05.
93 Supra note 19.
94 Supra note 18.
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ers. Italy still has this bonus tax in place95. In Germany it was discussed and
rejected – albeit for corporate managers in general96. The rationale behind this
kind of taxation, which goes beyond the simple application of the general
income tax rate to high-end salaries, is related to excessive risk-taking again97.
Under the assumption that the prospect of a government bail-out incentivizes
creditors to agree to low interest rates, thus making it easy for the bank to
assume high risks, the bank will make excess profits in the upside situation and
hand over corresponding losses to the state budget in the downside situation98.
This has led the IMF to propose a (Pigouvian) corrective tax, the “financial
activities tax” (FAT) covering both the excess profits of the bank (and its
shareholders) itself and the excess salaries handed out to the managers99.
Again one might ask whether from a regulatory point of view it makes sense to
introduce that sort of tax – either as a substitute for corporate governance
mechanisms or as a complement to substantive limitations – like the bank levy
in relation to the capital requirements. On the face of it there is one big benefit
and one big drawback. The benefit lies in the fact that the impact of any bonus
tax will be broad and it will be hard to circumvent its application. The same
holds true for tax provisions which restrict the deductibility of executive pay
when the bank’s taxable profit has to be assessed. Moreover, any increase in the
overall compensation package will lead to a higher tax (and one might even
think of a progressive scale to render such increases economically less attrac-
tive). On the other hand it is evident that any meaningful measurement of
excess profits or excess bonuses is extremely hard to implement100. In the first
place one has to make a counterfactual comparison between the bank’s profits
(and the bankers’ bonuses) in the undistorted situation and the profits in the
situation shaped by the bail-out prospect. This might be traced back to a
fictitious interest gap between distorted and undistorted interest rates for debt
capital granted by outsiders to the bank101. As a second step one would have to
take account of competition among banks – as they all benefit from this sub-
95 Supra note 18.
96 Supra note 18.
97 Michael Hilmer, Bailouts, Bonuses and Bankers’ Short Termism, Max Planck Institute
for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper 2014 – 17; Michael Hilmer, Too Many
to Fail – How Bonus Taxation Prevents Gambling for Bailouts, Max Planck Institute
for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper 2014 – 18.
98 Timothy Besley/Maitreesh Ghatak, Bailouts and the Optimal Taxation of Bonus Pay,
103 American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings (2013) p.163–167; Timothy
Besley/Maitreesh Ghatak, Taxation and Regulation of Bonus Pay, LSE STICERD
Research Paper No. EOPP 030, 2011.
99 IMF supra note 13, para 32 et seq.
100 IMF supra note 13, para 36 Box 6; Edgar supra note 30, p.426; Shackelford/Slemrod/
Shaviro supra note 24, p.797 et seq.
101 Garbarino/Allevato supra note 24, p.625.
ECFR 2/2016Wolfgang Schön446
Bereitgestellt von | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Universitätsbibliothek (LMU)
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 06.12.18 08:58
sidy, it is easily possible that they pass it on to their customers, a strategy that
would eradicate the economic rent from their own profit and loss account102.
Last not least one would have to distinguish between excessive salaries which
are due to the “classical” principal agent conflict observed in many industries
and the “special” conflict of interest under “debtholder governance” (to bor-
row again Klaus Hopt’s helpful definition).
But the biggest problem for any tax which is meant to constrain excess salaries
is the incidence of the tax. As long as under corporate governance rules there is
no upper ceiling for bankers’ compensation, any extra tax on bonuses can
easily be offset economically by an increase in bonus payments. The same
holds true if non-deductibility of these payments does not lead to a reduction
in size. The story of the U.S. tax treatment of stock options is a telling one103.
Back in 1980 the U.S. Congress enacted a tax provision, which prohibited the
deductibility of any fixed executive compensation payment beyond one mil-
lion dollars per year. The reason behind this move was the perception that
contracts providing for high fixed income did not meet the criteria of good
governance, as the aim of aligning the interests between managers and share-
holders was not fulfilled. Under the new framework, managers were invited to
show that profits had risen due to or at least during their time in office. This
extra tax burden on fixed salaries set free the issuing of stock options and
similar profit-related compensation packages. In the end, the overall compen-
sation of corporate managers in the United States rose to levels unseen before.
Also in the United Kingdom, bonus taxation of bankers led to an increase in
overall salaries (and to the relocation of banking business to Switzerland for a
limited time period)104.
To put it differently: Tax only works as an additional corrective if the regulator
really bites in the first place and sets hard and fast limitations to overall
compensation. Otherwise, any additional tax will largely be shifted towards
the shareholders or towards the customers by a simple increase in salary105. But
102 Although empirical evidence is scarce, a review of the literature has shown that banks
are able to pass on taxes to their customers (Copenhagen Economics, Elasticities of
Financial Instruments, Profits and Remuneration, European Commission Taxation
Papers, Working Paper 30-2012, para 3.2, p.29); most writers assume that bank em-
ployees will be able to capture this rent due to the scarcity of human capital in this field
(Edgar supra note 30, p.422 et seq.; Besley/Ghatak supra note 98 (2011) p.3).
103 Arne Friese/Simon Link/Stefan Mayer, Taxation and Corporate Governance – the State
of the Art, in: Wolfgang Schön (Ed.), Tax and Corporate Governance (Springer) 2008,
p.375–425 (at p.389 et seq.).
104 Julian S. Alworth/Giampaolo Arachi, Introduction, in: Julian S. Alworth/Giampaolo
Arachi (Ed.), Taxation and the Financial Crisis (OUP) 2012, p.1–27 (at p.12 et seq.).
105 Doina Radulescu, The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare,
in: 68 FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis (2010) p.1–16.
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at this point you can also turn the argument upside down: If executive pay is
sensibly constrained under “debtholder governance”, i.e. if the compensation
package does not give rise to an incentive for managers to take on excessive
risk, it does not make sense to put an extra layer of tax on top of it106 – at least if
it goes beyond the progressive scale of the income tax which has to be applied
anyway. A “bonus tax” proposed simply for redistributive reasons107 would
require substantial additional justification in the light of the overall income tax
framework.
V. Regulating and Taxing Financial Transactions
Currently, the most debated issue between regulation and taxation of financial
markets is the proposal of a “Financial Transactions Tax” which has been
floated in 2011 at the level of the European Union108 and which is still under
review for implementation by “enhanced cooperation”109. It is very clear that
the FTT seems to have a lot of appeal for lawmakers as it is meant to raise
enormous revenue for the states – if the scope is broad enough and if the rate is
high enough110. Politicians praise it as a major contribution of the financial
sector to the common good. Moreover it is meant to set a disincentive to
excessive speculation111, in particular high-frequency trading which is blamed
for a lot of dysfunctions in the financial markets112. But does it make sense to
apply this wide-reaching tax against the background of extensive and substan-
tive supervisory regulation of financial markets? Since the financial crisis, the
European Union and national legislators have not been passive when it comes
to targeted responses to deficiencies of financial markets. Substantial elements
of this major effort include the renovation or introduction of the “Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive” (MiFID II)113, the “Market Abuse Regula-
106 Edgar supra note 30, p.426 et seq.
107 Besley/Ghatak (2011) supra note 97, p.20 et seq.; Edgar supra note 30, p.426 et seq.
108 Supra note 21; a similar proposal for the U.S. under existing regulatory authority has
been put forward by Masur/Posner supra note 24 p.131 et seq.
109 Supra note 22.
110 Shackelford/Shaviro/Slemrod supra note 24, p.796 et seq.
111 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Spectulative Short-Term Trading, 3 Jour-
nal of Financial Services Research (1989) p.101–115.
112 Jonathan Fisher/Anita Clifford/Freya Dinshaw/Nicholas Werle, Criminal Forms of
high frequency trading on the financial markets, 9 Law and Financial Markets Review
(2015) p.113 –119; a balanced view on the negative externalities of modern trading
structures is taken by Merritt B. Fox/Lawrence R. Glosten/Gabriel V.Rauterberg, The
New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 Duke Law Journal (2015) p.191–277.
113 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15th May
2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/ED and
Directive 2011/61/EU, O.J. L 173 of 12th June 2014, p.349 et seq.
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tion”114, the “European Market Infrastructure Regulation” (EMIR)115, the
delegated regulation on short selling116 and many more legislative packages
which are meant to separate beneficial market transactions from harmful mar-
ket transactions.
While this regulatory legislation shows a high degree of sophistication sepa-
rating the good deals from the bad deals, the FTT would tax all transactions
alike, thus drowning the financial sector in a hot bath of muddy water. The
fiscal burden under the FTT does not depend at all on a qualitative assessment
of a financial transaction; it simply rises in proportion to the sheer quantity of
financial transactions117. From the perspective of an efficient corrective tax this
leads to the question whether the harm done to the financial markets is corre-
lated to the number of transactions performed by a taxpayer. Basically, this is
not the case. To the contrary: a high number of transactions signals the exis-
tence of a deep and liquid market and it contributes to a reduction of the bid-
ask spread for financial instruments118. When we apply the test formulated
above it cannot be said that the social costs of financial transactions incremen-
tally rise with the quantitative size of these events. Taxation seems to be ex-
actly the wrong instrument to fight abusive behavior. The one and only exam-
ple which is invoked by proponents of the FTT is high-frequency trading
which some regard as socially wasteful and thus the right target for a corrective
tax simply based on the number of transactions. But again the case is not so
clear119. There exist some questionable techniques of high-frequency trading –
like the market-manipulating efforts described in Michael Lewis’ bestseller on
the Flashboys who employed enormously fast electronic signals to intention-
ally distort demand and supply in proprietary markets120. But these techniques
are better addressed under a qualitative approach which prohibits certain
114 Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/
124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, O.J. L 173 of 12th June 2014, p.1 et seq.
115 Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4
July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, O.J. L 201
v. 27. 7. 2012, S. 1 et seq.
116 Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, O. J. L 86 of
24th March 2012, p.1 et seq.
117 IMF supra note 13, para 30 and Box 5; Hemmelgarn/Nicodème supra note 17, p.131 et
seq.; Wolfgang Schön, Die Finanztransaktionssteuer – ein “fairer Beitrag” des Finanz-
sektors? 176 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (2012) p.261–
267.
118 Garbarino/Allevato supra note 24, p.630 et seq.
119 Fox/Glosten/Rauterberg supra note 112; Vella supra note 30, at p.182 et seq.
120 Michael Lewis, Flashboys (Norton) 2014.
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behavior and not by a fiscal approach which is not able to distinguish between
socially useful and socially wasteful activities121.
The case against the FTT becomes even stronger when we recognize that the
regulatory technique employed under supervisory law and the quantitative
approach chosen under the FTT contradict each other in relevant situations.
Two striking examples have been analyzed by Caroline Heber and Christian
Sternberg from the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance in
Munich in an award-winning paper122. The first example concerns over-the-
counter trades (OTC trades) in financial derivatives. In the pre-crisis world,
financial institutions were entitled to enter into OTC trades simply on a
bilateral basis. If we applied the proposed directive on the financial transaction
tax to such an OTC trade, each of the involved parties would be liable to tax
exactly once. Contrary to this, under the European Market Infrastructure
Regulation of 2012 and under the MiFIR-Regulation of 2014, certain trades
in financial derivatives are required to be effected through Central Counter-
parties which can only be approached by special institutions admitted for
clearing purposes (so-called “clearing members”). To a large extent, this legis-
lation affects mostly OTC-derivatives as the European Institutions want to
reduce counterparty risk and to increase market transparency for OTC trades.
From the perspective of the regulatory goal this is perfectly fine. From the
perspective of the FTT it entails a multiplication of the number of taxable
transactions. Even if we take into account that the Central Counterparty as
such is exempt from FTT, neither the clearing members nor the financial
institutions triggering the transaction enjoy a similar beneficial treatment
under the current draft. The improvement of the regulatory framework by
interposing neutral agents leads to a higher tax burden. A similar effect can be
perceived with regard to short selling. Under the new Short Selling Regulation
market participants are obliged to enter into a hedge transaction before they
enter into the sale as such. Depending on the choices made ex post this hedge
transaction will have to be modified, canceled or executed. Again, the regu-
latory goal is fine but the regulatory technique forces market participants to
enter into additional financial transactions not required under the old regime.
Does it make sense to punish those who comply with the new rules by piling
121 Andreas M. Fleckner, Regulating Trading Practices, in: Eilís Ferran/Niamh Moloney/
Jennifer Payne (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP) 2015,
p.596–630 (at p.618).
122 Caroline Heber/Christian Sternberg, Over-the-Counter Derivative Markets in the
Light of EMIR Clearing Obligations and the Financial Transaction Tax, Derivatives
and Financial Instruments Journal (2014) p.107–116; see also Caroline Heber/Chris-
tian Sternberg, Market Infrastructure Regulation and the Financial Transaction Tax,
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2014–
07.
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several layers of taxation on them? These examples make perfectly clear that
taxation of financial transactions is not only superfluous but also dangerous
and counterproductive as there is a complete lack of coordination between the
regulation and the taxation of the financial sector.
VI. The Political Economy of the Choice between Regulation and Taxation
This last example paves the way to some concluding thoughts about the polit-
ical economy of the regulation and the taxation of the financial sector. Political
economy does not ask for the most efficient legal regime and rather examines
the underlying incentives for politicians, lobby groups and voters to push for a
specific piece of legislation. Politicians love corrective taxation as it pretends to
steer human behavior in the right direction while at the same time increasing
the funds available for politicians to exercise and to keep the power they have.
It is evident that one of the foremost incentives for the European Commission
to propose the FTT in the first place was the window of opportunity to
establish for the first time a dedicated tax at the level of the European Union
the revenue of which was meant to flow – at least in part – directly to the
European budget123. For national politicians, sympathy for the FTT is to a
large extent a mixture of symbolic policy (“tax the rich”) and budgetary
claims. And it does not force them to go into the details of a qualitative assess-
ment of beneficial and wasteful financial activities and to form a meaningful
statement on the pros and cons.
But there also exist political economy considerations which rather plead for
regulation instead of taxation. Building on previous work by James Buchanan
and Gordon Tullock124 on environmental legislation, scholars like Alberto
Alesina have pointed out that the majority of voters should prefer regulation
over taxation125. The reason is clear-cut: Regulation is by its very nature lim-
ited to some professional actors in the market whose impact in a popular vote
is rather small given the size of this constituency in the overall composition of
voters. Taxation, on the other hand, shows a tendency to have a broad scope,
putting a burden on many individuals and firms even if a progressive scale
123 Supra note 21.
124 Buchanan/Tullock supra note 80.
125 Alberto Alesina/Francesco Passarelli, Regulation versus Taxation, 110 Journal of Public
Economics (2014) p.147–156; Donato Masciandaro/Francesco Passarelli, Regulation
and Taxation: Economics and Politics, in: Julian S. Alworth/Giampaolo Arachi
(Ed.), Taxation and the Financial Crisis (OUP) 2012, p.257–269; Donato Mascian-
daro/Francesco Passarelli, The Political Economy of Containing Financial Systemic
Risk, in: Ruud de Mooij/Gaetan Nicodème (Ed.), Taxation and Regulation of the
Financial Sector (MIT) 2014, p.115–130.
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might hit some actors harder than others. As most voters want to avoid any
regulatory or fiscal burden, they will opt for regulation with a sharp focus on a
limited group of market participants. Unless these market participants com-
mand strong lobby power, the demands of the voters’ majority will be fol-
lowed by the political institutions.
VII. Conclusions
In its recently published Action Plan on the Capital Markets Union, the Euro-
pean Commission has named a few haphazard tax items which they regard as
obstacles to a fully-fledged capital market union. These include the afore-
mentioned “debt bias”126, the existence of withholding taxes on cross-border
dividend and interest payments127 as well as the lack of a Europe-wide Com-
mon Consolidated Corporate Tax Base128. While this list does not seem to
build on a deeply informed systematic approach to European Tax Policy it
seems odd, that none of the levies discussed in this article (bank levies, bonus
taxes, financial transaction taxes) are even mentioned in the Action Plan. One
should hope that the Commission will take these instruments into account
when they perform the comprehensive review of existing legislation an-
nounced in the Action Plan. And we should hope that they will seek guidance
in the motto given by Klaus Hopt to such an exercise: “Form follows Func-
tion”!
126 European Commission supra note 32, para 2, p.14
127 European Commission supra note 32, para 6.2., p.24
128 European Commission supra note 32, para 2, p.14.
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